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INTRODUCTION
Legal advisors have long held important roles in the conduct of military affairs, especially in time of war. That role has never been more essential than today. While international rules imposing limits on war have always been complex, the context of modern war and our ability to observe, record, and second-guess its prosecution further complicate the decision-making process.
The 'CNN effect' represents one aspect of this change. Real time observation of the conduct of war raises the level of scrutiny on targeting and weapon decisions. U.S.
commanders are blessed and burdened with sophisticated intelligence providing great battle space awareness, and advanced weapons systems, including precision guided munitions (hereinafter "PGM"), offering unprecedented accuracy. One of many questions facing commanders having this technology is whether they are obligated to use them despite higher costs to minimize "collateral" damage.
Additionally, U.S. justifications for war become complex as we reframe our national security strategy in the post cold war era. Increasingly, the U.S. is using the military instrument for humanitarian operations. This factor alone intensifies international scrutiny, since a military force doing great harm to civilian populations while attempting to "save them" undoubtedly will garner worldwide opprobrium.
Therefore today's commanders are dependent upon legal advice to prosecute war within the norms of international law and custom. This paper will demonstrate why lawyers are increasingly involved, especially in the area of targeting. Lawyers must discern clarity amidst shades of gray, weighing competing concerns over tough issues such as "dual use" properties. Lawyering is a growth industry in today's war fighting machine.
I. The Laws of War on Targeting
At first blush, the idea of civilized rules for the conduct of war seems absurd, an attempt to inject reason into a process which is inherently violent and unreasonable.
Nevertheless, a body of international law, treaties, and customary practices exists in part to limit the effects of war on innocent civilians and their property. Unfortunately, the doctrine raises more questions than it answers in distinquishing between legal and illegal targets. In today's high technology world, civilians and military officials share many key systems such as computer networks. Thus, balancing the military necessity of a particular dual-use target against the harm 3 LOW, 5-4, Geneva Protocol I (hereinafter "G.P.I"), Art. 48. 4 LOW, 5-5. 5 G.P.I, article 57(2). 6 LOW, 5-10. The U.S. has not ratified the Protocol containing this provision, but considers itself bound by it nevertheless.
caused to innocents becomes a complicated analysis by intelligence collectors, lawyers, and commanders.
II. Our Technology Entraps Us
The U.S. has made mighty advances in technology that are powerful enablers in the execution of war. Commanders receive sophisticated real time intelligence and have access to PGM's with virtually pinpoint accuracy. These advances are to be celebrated for the power and effectiveness they provide to the achievement of military objectives. But such technology is also a double-edged sword.
Lurking within ability may be a burden of obligation. If our intelligence systems provide us with unprecedented sophistication in identifying targets and PGM's better enable us to hit those targets we wish, aren't we likely to be judged by a higher standard than lesser-equipped fighting forces? Just as Father Hehir argues that embedded within the obligation to assist those in dire need is the ability to do so, isn't it arguable that embedded within one's ability may be an obligation to act?
Specifically, as the U.S. perfects PGM technology, will it be expected to forswear "dumb bombs", despite the costs? Lawyers will need to sort through such strategic questions as they balance the relative merits and legalities of particular targets.
III. The CNN Effect
Set against the foregoing backdrop of complexity, is a much closer level of international scrutiny of targeting decisions due to real time, detailed coverage by the media. Not only has the commander's job become more difficult, it has become more public. The "CNN effect" refers to the graphic nature of television coverage and its alleged power to affect national security decisions. This is especially true in light of our current strategy of engagement, which may increase U.S. involvement around the world. If our reasons for becoming involved are humanitarian, our actions undoubtedly will be held to a higher level of scrutiny.
U.S. forces cannot hurt innocents in the effort to help them. While humanitarian efforts, such as in Somalia, are inherently difficult for military forces to execute, the commander's task is complicated further by higher standards against which those efforts will be judged.
IV.
The Role of Lawyers in Targeting
Lawyers HRW was particularly harsh in its criticism of NATO's use of cluster bombs. While the U.S. restricted their use in populated areas by mid May, the British continued using them well into June. The report noted that where weapons used in troubling incidents could be ascertained, 75% involved the use of PGM's, including all bridge attacks and targets in Belgrade. 14 As noted earlier, the advent of such technological developments only raises the level of after-the-fact scrutiny of targeting decisions.
The report's pivotal question was whether "the prospect of civilian deaths (was) sufficiently taken into account in the targeting..." 15 The report concluded that target decisions were a principal contributing factor of civilian deaths and suggested that affirmative measures including better target selection "could indeed have been taken to further reduce the level of civilian harm during these military operations."
16
The report also attacked NATO's strategy of psychological warfare, determining that certain of the targets were chosen to harass civilians, including certain bridges, the radio and television station and others. Attacks on these targets caused great
suffering, yet HRW claimed that they had little if any military effect. HRW then called on NATO to review its doctrine on this type of strategy to consider whether it meets humanitarian law.
14 HRW, Summary, p. 5. 15 HRW, Summary, p. 6.
VI.
Strategic Implications for the Commander
The foregoing illustrates some of the complexities for today's commanders. Have we complicated our ability to conduct war beyond our own resource level?
Finally, can we afford to set ourselves above international regulation? In its investigation of Kosovo, the War Crimes Tribunal has sent NATO numerous interrogatories which thus far are unanswered. In fact, the U.S. has been harshly critical of this matter, which itself from scrutiny and hope to maintain the Tribunal's integrity as well as the U.S.'s own moral authority? These and other questions are topics for future analysis, however they illustrate some of the nitty-gritty targeting complications facing commanders in the modern world of war fighting.
VII. Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the considerations in prosecuting war grow more complex especially in the area of target selection. Outside scrutiny is becoming wider internationally and closer in detail. Advanced technology raises the standard against which our performance, and that of our allies, will be judged. The humanitarian justifications for many of these interventions further demands that U.S. forces do minimal harm as they attempt to aid the needy.
All of these considerations pose fundamental hazards for U.S. commanders and make them increasingly dependent upon legal advice in finding their way safely around the shoals. It is incumbent upon DOD's lawyers to foster U.S. moral authority by ensuring that when the U.S. employs force, it does so in a legal and justifiable manner. Such decisions must withstand close international scrutiny, for without moral authority the U.S. would lose an important component of power and irreparably damage its self-image.
19 "All Things Considered", NPR, 3/24/00.
